Vasiliki Skretay UCLA January 2005 Abstract This paper characterizes the revenue maximizing allocation mechanism in a T-period model under skreta@econ.ucla.edu 1. 1.
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Mechanism Design Auctions Institutions (Rating Agencies Intervention in View Vasiliki Skreta’s profile on LinkedIn, the world’s largest professional community. Vasiliki has 4 jobs listed on their profile. See the complete profile on LinkedIn and discover Vasiliki’s connections and jobs at similar companies. Vasiliki Skreta is a Professor of Economics at UCL. Prior to UCL, Professor Skreta was an Assistant Professor at the University of Minnesota, at the University of California, in Los Angeles and at NYU, Stern School of Business.
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Vasiliki Skreta, University of Hertfordshire, Dietetics Department, Alumnus. Studies Nutrition and Dietetics, Biochemistry, and Research Methodology.
Vasiliki Skreta, 2003. Vasiliki Skreta We study the revenue maximizing sequence of reservation prices, when the auction designer does not know the distribution from which the valuations of potential buyers are drawn.
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The Review of Economic Studies, Volume [2]: N. Figueroa, V. Skreta, The role of outside options in auction design, Mimeo, Universidad de Chile and New York University, 2007. Google Scholar. [3]. Philipp Schmidt-Dengler Joshua Schwartzstein Katja Seim Helen Simpson Vasiliki Skreta Zheng Song Konstantin Sonin Charles D. Sprenger Roland Strausz Vasiliki Skreta's Website. Search this site.
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Vasiliki Skreta, 2003. Vasiliki Skreta We study the revenue maximizing sequence of reservation prices, when the auction designer does not know the distribution from which the valuations of potential buyers are drawn.
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CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): This paper studies strategic information transmission in a dynamic environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision maker takes an action. Our main result is that, in contrast to a static environment, full information revelation is possible.
22 rows In a new study entitled “Immunity,” NYU Stern Professor Vasiliki Skreta and her co-authors, Karthik Reddy of Harvard Law School and Moritz Schularick of the University of Bonn, examine the relationship between political immunity provisions, which exist thr To speak with Professor Skreta, please contact her directly at 212-998-1432 or vskreta@stern.nyu.edu, or contact Anna Christensen in NYU Stern’s Office of Public Affairs at 212-998-0561 or achriste@stern.nyu.edu. ___ Vasiliki Skreta is an Assistant Professor of Economics. Search this site.
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We endogenize intermediaries' choice to operate as agents or merchants in a market where there are frictions due to asymmetric information about consumption values. Thomas Philippon and Vasiliki Skreta NBER Working Paper No. 15785 February 2010, Revised December 2010 JEL No. D02,D62,D82,D86,E44,E58,G01,G2 ABSTRACT We characterize cost-minimizing interventions to restore lending and investment when markets fail due to adverse selection.